I told my comrades, "We must be prepared; the English will attack soon "
We got our machine-gun ready on the top step of the dug-out and we put all our equipment on; then waited. We thought of God. We prayed. Then someone shouted, " They're coming! They're coming! " We rushed up and got our machine-gun in position. We could see the English soldiers pouring out at us, thousands and thousands of them. We opened fire.

Most of the British Infantry advanced into No-Man's-Land in a series of waves at one minute intervals. Each battalion ( a battalion normally consisted of 23 officers and about 700 men ) moved forward at a steady pace. Each wave would consist of the first and second lines of each company, for example the first line would be 'A ' Company consisting of about 50 men, followed by anther line of 50 men from the same Company. This would be then followed by ' B ' Company in two seperate lines and so on. In the rear would be the carrying platoons, battalion headquarters and the signals section. The pace was set at no more than 100 yards in every two minutes. Less than two hours per hour, and the men were forbidden to to cheer or shout, in case the enemy heard them coming. If faced by resistance, they were not to run until within twenty yards of the enemy, so as not to become exhausted. Rifles would be carried across the chest, It was indeed like a vast, complicated parade ground movement carried out in slow motion. It was sheer madness. As one soldier would say ' Assurance was given that the time honoured system of short rushes would in this instance, be unnecessary '

The 15th Lancashire Fusiliers ( 1st Salford Pals ) and the Newcastle Commercials of the 32nd Division, on the immediate right of the Ulster Division and next to Thiepval Wood, attacked the village of Thiepval directly. Their cause was hopeless in the face of uncut wire and overwhelmingly heavy machine-gun and rifle fire. The first three companies ( all six waves ) had been literally decimated and cut down by machine-gun fire. Hardly a man had reached the German front line. Both Commanding officers issued a sensible order: the last companies were not to go over and were to man the front line trench. Major Sauer of the German II Battalion 99 RIR, describes in the battalion history how the men had an ' indescribable battle joy ' as the garrison finished wave after wave of the attackers. Around the barbed wire in front of the village some hand to hand fighting ensued and many of the disorientated Pals were forced to crawl back towards their own lines. It was reported that some of the Salford men had penetrated the German trenches, but nothing was heard of them. The unfortunate consequence of this was that X Corps then concluded that Thiepval was held, in part at least, by British troops. The village itself was therefore not subjected to artillery fire throughout the rest of the day. The 16th Northumberland Fusiliers ( The Tyneside Commercials ) next to the Salfords were torn to pieces by enemy fire before they even reached the German front line. Their Battalion War Diary was bitter in their condemnation of the treatment the men had received at the hands of their executioners. It states " When the barrage lifted A and B Coys moved forward in waves and were instantly fired upon by the enemy Machine-guns and snipers. The enemy stood upon their parapet and waved to our men to ' come on ' and picked them off with rifle fire. The enemy's fire was so intense that the advance was checked and the waves, or what was left of them, were forced to lie down. On observing this, C Coy, the support Coy, moved out to reinforce the front line, losing a great number of men in doing so..orders were given for D Coy, the reserve Coy, to advance. Getting over the parapet the first platoon lost a great number of men and the remainder of the Coy was ordered to " stand fast " and hold the line.

How did men, having seen all of their friends being mown down by machine-gun fire , still have the courage to climb those ladders and step forward ? The below film gives an account of the situation on the Pals immediate front and subsequent attack on the German lines.

At 7.15am, fifteen minutes before zero hour, General Nugent, Commander of the 36th Ulster Division had taken the initiative and ordered the men from A and B companies out into ' No-Man's-Land '. In making this decision he saved so many lives. ( The 17th Highland Light Infantry also did the same attacking the Leipzig Redoubt next to the attack made by the Pals ) It is reported that the Ulstermen awaited the attack in a state of emotional religious fervour. Many were members of the Orange Order and some had sent for the orange sashes of their order and wore these over their bulky equipment. Hymns were sung, prayers were said. The Ulster men were ready for battle, although at least one had succumbed to an old Irish failing " Next to me was a man who was a well known drinker; his water bottle was full of some Fremch stuff and he was drinking all night. When it was time to go over, he collapsed drunk. I heard later that he came round, went over the top fighting mad and got taken prisoner .' ( L/Cpl J.A Henderson, Belfast Young Citizens )
At 7.30 am the men of Ulster went forward towards the enemy trenches. The assault past St. Pierre Divion by the right hand side of the 108th Brigade was opposed by III Battalion of 99 commanded by Haupman Mandel, supported by 8 Bavarian RIR. The extreme left of the 36th ( Ulster ) Division attacked north west of River Ancre towards Beaucourt, North of St. Pierre Divion. This attack was made by two Battalions of the 108th Brigade. The 12th Royal Irish Rifles and the 9th Royal Irish Fusiliers. They were repulsed. As a direct consequence the German machine-guns in Beaucourt Redoubt, confident that they were not under immediate threat on their front, quickly enfiladed the first advance of the 13th ( 1st County Down Volunteers ) the 11th
( South Antrim Volunteers )and the Royal Irish Rifles south east of the mill on the Ancre. Fortunately the first moves of the 36th Division as they debouched from Thiepval Wood into No Man's Land were hidden from Thiepval's defenders by a smoke screen thrown into the re-entrant north-east of Hammerhead Sap (which was situated near the top right of Thiepval Wood and nearest to Thiepval ) between Thiepval and the Schwaben Redoubt. The men were also greatly assisted by the artillery preperation which had been very thorough here. Practically all of the wire had been destroyed and the German trenches so smashed that men who had previously been on trench raids did not recognise them. The 11the Royal Irish Rifles men aimed to cross the German trenches which stretched from the Ulster Tower to a position three hundred yards east ( towards Thiepval ) However the intense enemy fire coming from their left and the area of the Beaucourt Redoubt pushed the men of the 13th Royal Irish Rifles rather to their right and further up the slopes towards Schwaben Redoubt than was intended. The enfilade fire from Beaucourt became even more intense as machine-guns in
St. Pierre Divion were brought up from their deep shelters and virtually wiped out any remaining men of the 13th Royal Irish Rifles caught in the open.. the survivors of the 13th Battalion's initial assault soon found themselves pinned down in the first two lines of German forward trenches, where bombing blocks were erected to secure the left flank of the Ulsters' advance. All the battalion's company officers had become casualties and only two platoons had pressed forward to the B lines. The 11th Royal Irish Rifles traversed Mill Road across a No Man's Land which was more than three hundred and fifty yards wide here. Having debouched from the very northern tip of Thiepval Wood. They passed the front German fire trench without real casualties. The 11th Royal Irish Rifles diary recorded at 7.50 am that " nothing was seen of the 13th Royal Irish Rifles on our left either at this or any other time during the battle and in consequence our left flank was always unprotected "


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